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The Louisiana Judiciary: In the Wake of Destruction
Greg G. Guidry*
INTRODUCTION
Hurricane Katrina stands as the most destructive natural
disaster in United States history.' Due to the catastrophic damage
inflicted throughout the coastal regions of Louisiana, Mississippi,
and Alabama, it was the costliest' and most devastating Atlantic
hurricane in recorded times. 3 Only Hurricane Rita surpassed it as
the most intense hurricane to enter the Gulf of Mexico.4 The
combination of these two storms wreaked havoc from the eastern
border of Texas to the panhandle of Florida, with the most
destructive impact on the state of Louisiana.
With over one million evacuees 5 and more than 200 000 homes
destroyed in the New Orleans metropolitan area alone,d the stories
associated with Hurricanes Katrina and Rita are too voluminous to
record. The impact and recovery differ for each person, family,
business, organization, and community affected. Over the
intervening years, innumerable events have been recounted
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1. See Joseph B. Treaster & N.R. Kleinfield, New Orleans Is Now Off
Limits; Pentagon Joins in Relief Effort, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 31, 2005, at Al
(quoting Peter Teahen, the national spokesman for the American Red Cross:
"We are looking now at a disaster above any magnitude that we've seen in the
United States").
2. Joby Warrick & Michael Grunwald, Investigators Link Levee Failures
to Design Flaws: Three Teams of Engineers Find Weakened Soil, Navigation
Canal Contributed to La. Collapses, WASH. POST, Oct. 24, 2005, at Al.
3. Hurricane Katrina's pressure measurement made it the fourth most
intense Atlantic hurricane on record at the time. RICHARD D. KNABB, JAMIE R.
RHOME & DANIEL P. BROWN, NAT'L HURRICANE CTR., TROPICAL CYCLONE
REPORT: HURRICANE KATRINA 23-30 AUGUST 2005, at 6 (2006), http://www.
nhc.noaa.gov/pdf/TCR-AL122005_Katrina.pdf [hereinafter NHC CYCLONE
REPORT: HURRICANE KATRINA]. It was also the strongest hurricane ever
recorded in the Gulf of Mexico at the time. Id. at 7.
4. RICHARD D. KNABB, DANIEL P. BROWN & JAMIE R. RHOME, NAT'L
HURRICANE CTR., TROPICAL CYCLONE REPORT: HURRICANE RITA 18-26
SEPTEMBER 2005 (2006), http://nhc.noaa.gov/pdf/TCR-AL182005_Rita.pdf
[hereinafter NHC CYCLONE REPORT: HURRICANE RITA].
5. NHC CYCLONE REPORT: HURRICANE KATRINA, supra note 3, at 13.
6. BRIAN W. CASHELL & MARC LABONTE, Gov'T & FIN. DIv.,
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERV., THE MACROECONOMIC EFFECTS OF
HURRICANE KATRINA 2 (2005), http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/
53572.pdf.
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throughout the media, while the response and recovery has been
analyzed by government, non-profit and private institutions, and
commentators from many professions.
The literature addressing Louisiana's court system generally
focuses on the deleterious losses that paralyzed the legal
community as a whole. Analysis of the judiciary's response to the
two hurricanes primarily focuses on the sufficiency of preparations
for efficient continuity of operations and disaster recovery. The
judicial branch has been closely scrutinized for the role it played in
the criminal justice system's post-disaster contingency planning
and ability to adapt to adversity. The commentary sheds light on
the chaos surrounding the plight of the criminally accused, who
were temporarily unable to access the courts amidst the collapse of
the public defender system.7
The purpose of this Article is to offer insight into the intimate
details of the state courts' response when faced with the near
collapse of the legal system's infrastructure. To be sure, the wind
and flood damage resulted in many foreseeable challenges for the
judicial system. Yet, the judiciary, like the other branches of state
government, grappled with a vast array of post-storm issues that
were not anticipated even with the recovery planning put in place
after the horrific events of September 11, 2001.8 These post-storm
issues include the magnitude of catastrophic destruction, the long-
term displacement of the entire New Orleans population, the
paralysis of neighboring cities and states with the mandatory
evacuation of coastal communities, and the scope of inadequate
governmental response. The judiciary navigated through
unchartered territory in promptly addressing the logistical mayhem
associated with the mass closure of courts and the displacement of
Louisiana jurists.9 The Louisiana Supreme Court, in its capacity as
administrator of justice, with the collaborative efforts of the
7. JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATOR'S OFFICE, THE SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA,
JusTICE AT WORK: THE STATE OF JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE IN LOUISANA 2005-
2006, at 9 (2006), http://www.lasc.org/pressroom/annual_reports/reports/2005 06
jp.pdf [hereinafter JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE 2005-2006].
8. Following the events of September 11, 2001, the Louisiana courts
implemented crisis preparedness procedures and training to ensure minimal
disruptions of regular judicial operations and functions in the event of an
emergency or disaster. Interview with John Olivier, Clerk of Court, Supreme
Court of Louisiana, in New Orleans, La. (Feb. 24, 2010) [hereinafter Olivier
Interview]. This included, in part, creation of an off-site computer data back-up
center, implementation of an emergency communication alert system, and
securing alternative work sites for staff that afforded full information and
communication operations. Id.
9. JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE 2005-2006, supra note 7, at 9. Fifty-two
percent of active Louisiana lawyers had offices in hurricane-impacted areas. Id.
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executive and legislative branches of state government, became
proficient in addressing separation of powers issues barring access
to the courts in the wake of the disasters. These measures
represented an attempt to ensure the full constitutional protections
afforded to Louisiana citizens, including the criminally accused.
In the five years since the storms, there has been no
comprehensive study documenting the supreme court's
establishment of a continuity of operations, recovery measures, and
the pressing issues facing the Louisiana judiciary as it prepares for
the future. Hopefully, this Article will prove to be beneficial in that
respect. More importantly, it is written with the hope that it will
educate judicially related entities in preparing and coping with
future disasters.
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. New Orleans: The Center of the Louisiana Judiciary
The Louisiana Supreme Court is the highest state court in
Louisiana and is located in the city of New Orleans. It includes
seven justices who are elected for ten-year terms in partisan
elections.10 The court has its legal roots in the eighteenth century
French and Spanish governments that occupied the territory later
acquired by the United States pursuant to the Louisiana Purchase in
1803.11 The massive white marble and granite Louisiana Supreme
Court building, completed in 1910, is located down the street from
the historical sites that served as the headquarters of the earliest
French and Spanish rulers. In addition to the supreme court, the
building serves as home to the Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeal, the Louisiana Judicial Administrator's Office, the Louisiana
Supreme Court Museum, the Louisiana State Law Library, and
satellite offices for a small cluster of state court-related agencies. '
2
New Orleans is located at the mouth of the Mississippi River,
which forms part of the largest river system on the North American
continent.13 Being below sea level, the city has little elevation to
protect from flooding, a life-threatening issue for the hurricane-
prone area.14 In the late 1800s, aggressive measures were taken to
10. LA. CONST. art. V, § 3.
11. See JOE GRAY TAYLOR, LOUISIANA, A HISTORY 48-49 (1984).
12. Exec. Order No. KBB 04-26, La. Reg. 1947 (Aug. 20, 2004).
13. National Park Service, Mississippi National River and Recreation Area:
Mississippi River Facts, http://www.nps.gov/miss/riverfacts.htm (last visited
Mar. 31, 2010).
14. CHIusTINE F. ANDERSEN ET AL., AM. SOC'Y OF CIvIL ENG'RS HURRICANE
KATRINA EXTERNAL REVIEW PANEL, NEW ORLEANS HURRICANE PROTECTION
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reduce the city's flooding to accommodate the growing population
that relocated to the bustling port along the river.'5 While levees
and drainage canals had already been built in many areas, land was
further made available through the construction of complex
wooden screw pumps, many of which were still in operation when
Hurricane Katrina made landfall. 16 The goal was to pump flood
waters into canals, which would channel the water into Lake
Pontchartrain, an outlet to the Gulf of Mexico, and surrounding
swamps. These protective measures spared the city from flooding
on innumerable occasions through the decades.' However, the
protection faltered in the summer of 2005 with Hurricanes Katrina
and Rita. Storm surgXe and poorly constructed levees that breached
in several locations quickly turned New Orleans into a soup bowl
for water pouring in from Lake Pontchartrain and the Mississippi
River. 19 The toxic water sat for days and, in many areas, weeks
until it could be pumped out.
B. Hurricane Katrina
Residents along the Gulf Coast annually adjust their daily lives
in preparation for the threat of storms and hurricanes during
hurricane season, the months of June through October. The year
2005 was no different. Hurricane Katrina formed as a tropical
depression over the southeastern part of the Bahamas on Friday,
August 23, 2005. 20 Although it was quickly upgraded to a tropical
SYSTEM: WHAT WENT WRONG AND WHY 8 (2007), http://www.asce.org/files/pdf/
ERPreport.pdf [hereinafter CIVIL ENG'RS LEVEE REPORT] ("Large portions of
Orleans, St. Bernard, and Jefferson parishes are currently below sea level and
continue to sink. New Orleans is built on thousands of feet of soft sand, silt, and
clay. Subsidence, or settling of the ground surface, occurs naturally due to the
consolidation and oxidation of organic soils (called 'marsh' in New Orleans) and
local groundwater pumping. In the past, flooding and deposition of sediments
from the Mississippi River counterbalanced the natural subsidence, leaving
southeast Louisiana at or above sea level.").
15. See generally Greg O'Brien, Making the Mississippi River Over Again:
The Development of River Control in Mississippi, MississiPI HISTORY Now,
Mar. 2002, http://mshistory.k12.ms.us/index.php?id=94.
16. John McQuaid, New Orleanian 's Design Revolutionized the
Netherlands, THE TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Nov. 13, 2005, http:/www.
nola.com/printer/printer.ssf?/speced/ruinandrecovery/articles/wood.html.
17. Id.
18. See generally CivIL ENG'RS LEVEES REPORT, supra note 14; see also
Warrick & Grunwald, supra note 2.
19. Treaster & Kleinfield, supra note 1.
20. NOAA Satellite and Information Service, Climate of 2005 Summary of
Hurricane Katrina, http://lwf.ncdc.noaa.gov/oa/climate/research/2005/katrina. html
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depression,2 1 it was not initially considered a serious threat to
Louisiana. It weakened as it hit Florida on August 25, 2005, as a
category one storm.22 The following day, the hurricane entered the
Gulf of Mexico, where it quickly reorganized and intensified.23
State and local officials conducted a joint press conference asking
residents to voluntarily leave the city based on predictions of
tumultuous winds and severe flooding.24 Shortly thereafter, Max
Mayfield of the National Hurricane Center (NHC) contacted the
mayor of New Orleans to warn him of the potential impending
disasters. It was only the second occasion that the director of the
NHC called a public leader for such a purpose. 26 A mandatory
evacuation of the New Orleans area was called on Sunday, August
28, 2005, 27 after Hurricane Katrina had become a monstrous
category five hurricane with wind speeds in excess of 170 miles
per hour.28 President George W. Bush issued emergency disaster
declarations for counties and parishes throughout the Gulf Coast
states, which shut down or reduced operations in various oil
refineries and closed several major airports. 29 The presidential
(last visited Mar. 31, 2010) [hereinafter NOAA Katrina Climate Summary];
Oversight Hearing on NOAA Hurricane Forecasting: Hearing Before the H.
Select Committee for Hurricane Katrina 2 (2005) (statement of Max Mayfield,
Director, Tropical Prediction Center-National Hurricane Center) [hereinafter
Mayfield Statement].
21. NOAA Katrina Climate Summary, supra note 20.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. LA. OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR, OVERVIEW OF GOVERNOR KAThLEEN
BABINEAUX BLANCO'S ACTIONS IN PREPARATION FOR AND RESPONSE TO
HURRICANE KATRINA (2005), http://www.nola.com/katrina/
viewhtml.ssf?/katrinalblancodocs/govsresponse.html.
25. Mayfield Statement, supra note 20, at 5; see also Katrina Heads for
New Orleans, FOX NEWS, Aug. 29, 2005, http://foxnews.com/story/
0,2933,167270,00.html ("'It's capable of causing catastrophic damage,'
Mayfield said. 'Even well-built structures will have tremendous damage. Of
course, what we're really worried about is the loss of lives. New Orleans may
never be the same .... All indications are that this is absolutely worst-case
scenario,' Ivor van Heerden, deputy director of the Louisiana State University
Hurricane Center, said....").
26. ANDERSON COOPER, DISPATCHES FROM THE EDGE: A MEMOIR OF WAR,
DISASTERS AND SURVIVAL 124 (2006).
27. Joseph Treaster & Abby Goodnough, Powerful Storm Threatens Havoc
Along Gulf Coast, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 2005, at Al ("Louisiana state officials
said at one point during the evacuation of New Orleans on Sunday, more than
18,000 cars an hour were leaving the city.").
28. NOAA Katrina Climate Summary, supra note 20.
29. Press Release, White House, Statement on Federal Emergency
Assistance for Louisiana (Aug. 27, 2005), http://georgewbush-whitehouse.
2010] 1149
0LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
orders did not include the coastal parishes of Jefferson, Orleans,
Plaquemines, St. Bernard, St. Charles, and Terrebonne.3 °
Hurricane Katrina made landfall in Louisiana as a category
three storm with sustained winds of approximately 125 miles per
hour near Placglemines Parish, 31 and 100 mile per hour gusts in
Orleans Parish. 32 The water surge created a wall, estimated in some
locations along the Gulf Coast to be as high as thirty feet, that
obliterated everything in its path.33 The storm moved northward
inflicting heavy damage to central Mississippi.34 At the end of the
day, the intensity of the storm had taken an insurmountable toll on
the coastal areas of south Louisiana. Storm surge and wind
annihilated the lower half of Plaquemines Parish,35 and the storm
surge from the Mississippi River Gulf Outlet (MRGO) 36
overtopped the levees in St. Bernard Parish,37 sending a deluge of
water as high as rooftops that festered for weeks. 38 In Jefferson
Parish, drainage pump operators were evacuated, resulting in
widespread flooding.3
9
archives.gov/news/releases/2005/08/20050827-1.html [hereinafter White House
Press Release]; see also Treaster & Goodnough, supra note 27.
30. White House Press Release, supra note 29.
31. National Ocean & Atmospheric Administration, Hurricane Katrina-Most
Destructive Hurricane Ever to Strike the U.S., http://www.katrina.noaa.gov (last
visited Mar. 31, 2010).
32. NOAA Katrina Climate Summary, supra note 20.
33. Id. at 6.
34. Id. at 5.
35. Treaster & Kleinfield, supra note 1.
36. The MRGO is a seventy-six-mile long outlet completed in 1965 as a
navigation shortcut to the Port of New Orleans. Warrick & Grunwald, supra
note 2. At the time of Katrina's landfall, it was virtually never used. The
presence of the outlet created a funnel that accelerated and enlarged the storm
surge, which impacted levees in the New Orleans area. Id.
37. Brian Thevenot & Manuel Torres, Flooding Wipes Out Two
Communities, THE TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Aug. 30, 2006, at Al.
("The scene wouldn't change . . .deep into St. Bernard Parish, where water
smothered two-story houses, people and animals.").
38. Laura Parker & Alan Levin, City's Coming Back, but not to Normal
Life, USA TODAY, Sept. 16, 2005, at Al ("The Army Corps of Engineers said
that, barring rainfall, the city will be drained by Oct. 2.").
39. See Kate Moran, Jefferson Building Shelters for Operators, THE TIMES-
PICAYUNE (New Orleans), May 28, 2006, at HURRICANE PREPARATION 5
("If faulty levees and flood walls doomed much of New Orleans and St. Bernard
Parish to flooding during Katrina, it has become the accepted wisdom that
neighborhoods in Jefferson Parish succumbed to water not because of failing
infrastructure but because of the evacuation of 200 public employees who were
supposed to keep the drainage pumps working.").
[Vol. 701150
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In neighboring Orleans Parish, city leaders and residents were
initially relieved that the storm's perilous east side skimmed past
them.4" The sigh of relief was short lived. The next dayi several
breaks in the surrounding levee system were discovered. Eighty
percent of the city was submerged, with water running as deep as
twenty feet.42 From that day, any sense of normalcy vanished for
affected Louisiana residents for months, or years in some cases.
Thousands who did not heed evacuation warnings were left
stranded in the heavily damaged Louisiana Superdome,43 the New
Orleans Convention Center, and, worse, on rooftops surrounded by
the waters that engulfed the city. 44 Helpless residents were rescued
by helicopters and boats of all sizes.45 Throughout the Gulf Coast,
federal and state military and police units were called in to restore
order. Over 200,000 homes, mostly in New Orleans and
surrounding areas, were destroyed.46 Water, food, gasoline, and
electricity, the most basic of necessities, became invaluable
commodities. Urgent pleas for help were heard world-wide.
C. Hurricane Rita
Less than one month later, the coastal communities of Louisiana
suffered a second natural disaster, the strongest hurricane to strike
40. Treaster & Kleinfield, supra note 1.
41. Id.; see also CIVIL ENG'RS LEVEE REPORT, supra note 14, at 1
(Katrina's storm surge caused over fifty different levee breaches in greater New
Orleans, submerging eighty-percent the city, and two-thirds of the flooding was
caused by the multiple failures of the city's flood walls).
42. Treaster & Kleinfield, supra note 1.
43. See Anne Rochell Konigsmark & Mimi Hall, New Orleans Lacks
Emergency Shelter as Storm Season Nears, USA TODAY, Mar. 21, 2006, at 2A
("During Hurricane Katrina, which hit New Orleans on Aug. 29, the Superdome
became a nightmare for 20,000 residents who rode out the storm there. The roof
peeled off and it rained inside; the building lost power and it became dark and
hot; toilets stopped working; and food and water became scarce.").
44. Bruce Nolan, Catastrophic: Storm Surge Swamps 9th Ward, St.
Bernard, Lakeview Levee Breach Threatens to Inundate City, THE TIMES-
PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Aug. 31, 2005, at Al ("[Pleople scrambled into their
attics or atop their roofs, pleading for help from the few passers.").
45. See, e.g., U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, COAST GUARD:
OBSERVATIONS ON THE PREPARATION, RESPONSE, AND RECOVERY MISSIONS
RELATED TO HURRICANE KATRINA 1 (2006), http://gao.gov/new.items/d06903.
pdf ("Of the estimated 60,000 people left stranded by Hurricane Katrina, over
33,500 were saved by the Coast Guard.").
46. Charles Herman, Katrina's Economic Impact: One Year Later, ABC
NEWS/MONEY, Aug. 25, 2006, http://abc.news.go.com/Business/Hurricane
Katrina/storyid=2348619&page= 1.
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the southwest area of the state in four decades. 47 Hurricane Rita
formed along the Turks and Caicos Islands.48 On September 21,
2005, sustained winds were recorded in excess of 175 miles per
hour.49 It made landfall three days later as a category three hurricane
between Sabine Pass, Texas, and Johnson Bayou, Louisiana. 50 With
the horrific images of Hurricane Katrina fresh in the public's mind,
most residents living in surrounding communities heeded evacuation
orders.5 1 Nonetheless, there was extensive physical damage to
southwest Louisiana. Virtually 5 2all of Cameron Parish sustained
heavy damage and destruction. There was extensive flooding in
Lake Charles, as well as throughout Calcasieu and Vermilion
Parishes.53 Almost every levee in Terrebonne Parish was breached
or overtopped, resulting in widespread flooding.54 The torrential
wind and rain caused two levees in Orleans Parish to refracture,
causing renewed flooding in areas of Orleans and St. Bernard
Parishes.55
D. The Aftermath of the Destruction
Over 2,000 lives were lost as a result of the successive storms.
56
The magnitude of the physical destruction and resources needed for
47. National Weather Service Weather Forecast Office Lake Charles, LA,
Hurricane Rita, http://www.srh.noaa.gov/lch/?n=rita_main (last visited Mar. 31,
2010) [hereinafter NWS Lake Charles Rita Report] ("Rita was the strongest
hurricane to strike Southeast Texas and Southwest Louisiana since Hurricane
Audrey in June, 1957.").
48. NHC CYCLONE REPORT: HURRICANE RITA, supra note 4, at 2.
49. NOAA Satellite and Information Service, Climate of 2005 Summary of
Hurricane Rita, http://lwfncdc.noaa.gov/oa/climate/research/2005/rita.html (last
visited Mar. 31, 2010).
50. NHC CYCLONE REPORT: HURRICANE RITA, supra note 4, at 2.
51. Seeid. at8.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 7.
55. NAT'L WEATHER SERV. NEW ORLEANS/BATON ROUGE WEATHER
FORECAST OFFICE, HURRICANE RITA POST-TROPICAL CYCLONE REPORT 3
(2005), http://www.srh.noaa.gov/lix?n=psh rita.
56. As to the deaths related to Hurricane Katrina, see NHC CYCLONE
REPORT HURRICANE KATRINA, supra note 3, at 11 ("The total number of
fatalities known, as of this writing, to be either directly or indirectly related to
Katrina is 1833, based on reports to date from state and local officials in five
states: 1577 fatalities in Louisiana, 238 in Mississippi, 14 in Florida, 2 in
Georgia, and 2 in Alabama. . . . Where Katrina ranks among the deadliest
hurricanes on record in the United States is somewhat uncertain due to the
unknown number of fatalities caused directly by this hurricane and by some
others in the past .... As a result, Katrina ranks fourth or fifth on the list of the
deadliest hurricanes on record in the United States."); Editorial, Our Opinions:
1152 [Vol. 70
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the recovery were incomprehensible. The two hurricanes combined
completely destroyed an area the size of Great Britain,57 with
damage estimates in the billions of dollars. The toll on ill-equipped
local and state governments resulted in the loss of the most basic of
municipal services. Recovery was uncertain.
A number of Louisiana courts were profoundly damaged as a
result of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. Following the first storm,
twenty courthouses in southeastern Louisiana were damaged or
rendered inoperable, including the supreme court building, which
was closed due to the mandatory evacuation of the city and the loss
of basic services, including water and electricity. 58 The parishes of
Orleans, Plaquemines, St. Bernard, and St. Tammany were hardest
hit.59 Six additional courts in the parishes of Cameron, Vermilion,
Calcasieu, and Jefferson Davis were affected or heavily damaged
by Hurricane Rita. 60 The district court facilities in Cameron,
Orleans, Plaquemines, and St. Bernard Parishes suffered extensive
physical damage. 6 1 The Plaquemines Parish court facility was
unable to be salvaged.62
The damage to courthouses generally involved the destruction
of their contents, including, in part, court records and physical
evidence. The hardest hit municipalities sustained extensive losses
A Stormy Century, THE TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Jan. 30, 2010, at D4
("Hurricane Katrina made landfall as a Category 3 storm and caused... 1,833
deaths.").
As to the deaths related to Hurricane Rita, see NI-IC CYCLONE REPORT:
HURRICANE RITA, supra note 4, at 8 ("Seven fatalities have been directly
attributed to the forces of Rita"; five casualties in Texas, and one casualty in
Louisiana, Mississippi, and Florida, respectively); NWS Lake Charles Rita Report,
supra note 47 ("Hurricane Rita caused seven direct fatalities .... At least 55
indirect fatalities were associated with the evacuation and aftermath...
57. JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE 2005-2006, supra note 7, at 4.
58. Id. at 3.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 8.
61. Id. at 10, 20, 21.
62. In 2001, the 112-year-old Plaquemines Parish courthouse, located in
Point-a-la-Hache, Louisiana, was destroyed by fire. Louisiana State Facts and
Information, Louisiana Burned Courthouses, http://mylouisianageneaology.com/
index/html (last visited Mar. 31, 2010). Thereafter, court proceedings were
conducted at a community center, which was destroyed in Hurricane Katrina.
Interview with Dorothy Lundin, Clerk of Court, Twenty-fifth Judicial District
Court for the Parish of Plaquemines, in New Orleans, La. (Apr. 27, 2010). The
Federal Emergency Management Agency installed seven mobile units to serve
as temporary court facilities until the courthouse destroyed by the fire is
redeveloped. Id.; see also Federal Emergency Management Agency, Public
Assistance Projects in Plaquemines Parish Sept. 15, 2007, http://www.fema.gov/
xls/ehp/noma/prject/plaquemines091507.xls (last visited Apr. 27, 2010).
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to their court-related agencies. For example, in addition to the
damage to its civil and criminal court complexes, Orleans Parish
suffered extensive flood-related losses to its police headquarters,
criminal evidence rooms, jail, district attorney's office, public
defender's office, and clerk of court offices.63 The parish
governments of Cameron, St. Bernard, and Plaquemines Parishes
sustained similar infrastructure losses.64 Many court-related
agencies were essentially shuttered closed due to the absence of a
sustainable tax base to finance the operating costs.6 5 Those
burdened with the task of reestablishing a continuity of operations
and instituting disaster recovery, namely judges, parish officials,
and their support staff, were indefinitely displaced due to the loss
of their homes and personal belongings, making the situation even
more dire.
In north Louisiana, many parishes that did not sustain physical
damage were affected by the mass temporary and permanent
relocation of displaced individuals. 66 The inundation of evacuees
pressed governmental services, including law enforcement, to their
limits.
II. THE LOUISIANA SUPREME COURT'S IMMEDIATE RESPONSE
Immediately following Hurricane Katrina's landfall, it was
obvious that the supreme court would not be returning to its New
Orleans headquarters for an extended period of time. Louisiana law
provides that the chief justice of the supreme court is the chief
administrative officer of the state's judicial system." In the
summer of 2005, the supreme court's chief justice was New
63. Brandon L. Garrett & Tania Tetlow, Criminal Justice Collapse: The
Constitution after Hurricane Katrina, 56 DUKE L.J. 127, 146 (2006).
64. JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE 2005-2006, supra note 7, at 44.
65. See, e.g., Hon. Sarah S. Vance, Justice After Disaster-- What Hurricane
Katrina Did to the Justice System in New Orleans, 51 How. L.J. 621, 628, 631-33
(2008) ("The staff of the [Orleans Parish] District Attorney's office was decimated
because the office lost funding when the city's tax base collapsed .... Although
Hurricane Katrina dealt a staggering blow to the District Attorney's Office, it left
the New Orleans Public Defender's office even more crippled.... About 75% of
this budget was financed through traffic court fines. After the storm, with a
reduced population and reduced police force to pursue traffic violations, money
for the defender system effectively dried up." (citations omitted)).
66. JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE 2005-2006, supra note 7, at 44.
67. LA. CONST. art. V, § 6 ("The judge oldest in point of service on the
supreme court shall be chief justice. He is the chief administrative officer of the
judicial system of the state, subject to rules adopted by the court.").
[Vol. 701154
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Orleans native Pascal F. Calogero, Jr., now retired.68 Chief Justice
Calogero instituted efforts in conjunction with the court's six
associate justices and critical staffers to ensure a continuity of
judicial operations and commencement of disaster recovery
measures. 6The justices identified the factors warranting immediate
consideration: leadership, temporary court headquarters, the safety
and welfare of judicial employees, communication and
technological infrastructure, legal and administrative issues
stemming from the non-functioning courts and the mass
displacement of the legal community, and disaster recovery
assistance offered by the Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA).70
A. Leadership
The National Center for State Courts suggests that judicial
leadership "set[s] the tone for effective emergency management"
following a disaster.7' Chief Justice Calogero had initially
evacuated to Houston, like thousands of other Louisiana residents,
but returned shortly after the storm upon securing an apartment for
his family outside of Baton Rouge. Because of the amount of time
and concentrated effort that would be required, and the fact that he
was dealing with the loss of personal property and displacement of
family members, Chief Justice Calogero appointed then Justice
Catherine "Kitty" Kimball, the court's current chief justice, 72 to
coordinate the judiciary's immediate recovery efforts.73 Justice
Kimball acted as judiciary liaison as governmental officials
collaboratively identified problems and crafted solutions in an
effort to restore law and order.74 Justice Kimball worked tirelessly
with federal and state criminal justice agencies to ensure that all
possible measures were taken to protect the constitutional
68. Chief Justice Calogero was elected to the supreme court in 1972. He
served as the court's chief justice from 1990 through December 2008. About
This Issue, LA. B.J., Dec. 2008/Jan. 2009, at 248. He served as the court's chief
justice from 1990 through December 2008. Id. at 247.
69. JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE 2005-2006, supra note 7, at 6.
70. Id. at 6-7.
71. National Center for State Courts, Emergency Management for Courts,
http://www.ncsconline.org/ProjectsInitiatives/BPI/EmergencyMngmnt.htm#en
sure (last visited Mar. 31, 2010).
72. Justice Kimball was elected to the supreme court in 1992 and
commenced her tenure as chief justice in January 2009. Louisiana Supreme
Court, Chief Justice Catherine D. Kimball, http://www.lasc.org/justices/
kimball.asp (last visited Apr. 8, 2010).
73. JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE 2005-2006, supra note 7, at 6.
74. Id. at 6, 8, 10.
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entitlements afforded to each criminal defendant.75 She directly
supervised the judiciary's complex, long-term dealings with
FEMA.76
Justice Kimball met daily with Chief Justice Calogero, the
supreme court clerk of court, the judicial administrator, key
staffers, and the other justices, when available. 77 She diligently
handled all aspects of her storm-imposed management position
with the help of a handful of staffers. Justice Kimball's role as the
judiciary's hurricane recovery leader is ongoing as of this
writing."78
B. Temporary Court Accommodations
The damage sustained to the supreme court building as a result
of the hurricanes did not render the complex inoperable. Its closure
was a consequence of the massive destruction in the city, which
resulted in the rigid enforcement of the mandatory evacuation
order. On the day following Hurricane Katrina's landfall, the
supreme court had already investigated the feasibility of securing
modular trailers to temporarily house judicial offices. 79 The
justices were cognizant that the court would be unable to sustain a
continuity of operations in the absence of essential court
personnel.8 ° Trailer placement was contingent on locating a site in
75. Id. at 10.
76. Id. at 6.
77. Id. at 8.
78. For commentary of Justice Kimball's personal perspective on the
judiciary's response following the storms, see Molly McDonough, Gulf Coast
Courts Rode Out the Storm; Now They're Struggling to Come Back: Picking Up
the Pieces, A.B.A. J., Feb. 2006, at 41 ("'Even though all my life I had heard
that a hurricane would come and wipe out New Orleans, no one understood the
magnitude of this disaster ... ' says Catherine D. Kimball, [then] an associate
justice of the Louisiana Supreme Court. Kimball has an apartment near New
Orleans, where her court is based. But her permanent chambers are in Baton
Rouge, at the state's First Circuit Court of Appeal. It was from there, in the
hours and days after the storm, that she made it her mission to find judges from
every affected court, keep them connected and get the courts operating as
quickly as possible. 'From the very first day, these courts wanted to go back to
operating,' she says. 'There was a desire for normalcy that was just
overwhelming."').
79. Olivier Interview, supra note 8.
80. JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE 2005-2006, supra note 7, at 8; see also
Thomas A. Birkland & Carrie A. Schneider, Emergency Management in the
Courts: Trends After September 11 and Hurricane Katrina, 28 JUST. SYs. J. 20,
27 (2007) ("[C]ourt leadership inspired all members of the court community to
work together to reopen the courts. Court managers are also important leaders.
In the Louisiana cases, the clerks of court and their staffs took major leadership
roles in a wide range of activities. These ranged from working with the IT staff
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close proximity to available housing and related amenities such as
schools, for displaced court employees and their families. Within
a matter of hours of the subject being raised, various sites were
considered, some even inspected, including England Air Park
located in Alexandria, Louisiana.
82
Less than forty-eight hours after Hurricane Katrina struck, the
court set up interim offices at the Louisiana First Circuit Court of
Appeal courthouse. 83 The building offered an adequate amount of
space and court-related necessities to resume operations. Justice
Kimball already had an existing office in the courthouse, 84 which
was conveniently located near the Louisiana State Capitol Building
and Annex, allowing easy accessibility to the offices of the
governor and legislature.
85
Several of the displaced justices, including Chief Justice
Calogero, had established offices at the first circuit less than a
week after Hurricane Katrina's landfall.86 The convenience of
communal space afforded the necessary interaction between the
justices and key staff. While engaging in recovery efforts, the
justices, as early as two weeks after the storm, began to meet
weekly in Baton Rouge to handle pending emergency
administrative and writ matters. 87 However, the court's temporary
move to Baton Rouge was problematic for court personnel. It
to ensure that critical computers were recovered from buildings to ensuring that
payroll systems were in place and finding all court personnel. These challenges
were not as severe after September 11, because the attacks did not directly affect
many residential areas, nor did they as severely affect telecommunications and
utilities as did Hurricane Katrina.").
81. Olivier Interview, supra note 8; see also Birkland & Schneider, supra
note 80, at 26 ("The physical damage done by the storm was compounded by the
effect of devastation at this scale on New Orleans as a community. Many people
had been relocated, or had left New Orleans with no clear plan for returning.
The storm therefore presented a greater challenge than most court leaders had
anticipated. For example, 'For both state and federal courts, the surprising
discovery was that the biggest obstacle to gearing up was not court infrastructure
as much as finding staff housing and a place to send their children to school."').
82. Olivier Interview, supra note 8.
83. JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE 2005-2006, supra note 7, at 6.
84. JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF THE SUPREME COURT, SUPREME COURT OF
LOuIsIANA: ANNUAL REPORT 2 (2005), http://www.lasc.org/pressroom/annual
reports/reports/2005_AnnualReport.pdf [hereinafter JUDICIAL COUNCIL, 2005
ANNUAL REPORT].
85. See Downtown Development District: The Sights & Sounds of
Downtown, Interactive Map to Explore Downtown Baton Rouge, http://www.
passionforprogress/index.cfn?md=directory (last visited Apr. 23, 2010).
86. JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE 2005-2006, supra note 7, at 8.
87. Id.
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quickly became apparent that their families would need more
permanent housing. Like so many cities in Louisiana, Baton Rouge
was inundated with displaced families from the coastal areas. The
lack of available housing and schools, coupled with fruitless
negotiations with FEMA for temporary housing, prevented the
return to work of many employees.
The court managed to secure office space for employees who
were able to acquire housing in the Baton Rouge area. Several
essential employees were located at the first circuit, and office
space was leased for other personnel, primarily those employed in
the judicial administrator's office. 89 The first circuit permitted two
trailers purchased by the supreme court to be placed on the
courthouse lawn.90 The trailers served as the location for court
filings and additional office space. 91 When the supreme court
returned to New Orleans, the units were utilized by the Orleans
Parish Criminal District Court, which sustained extensive damage
to its courthouse.
92
C. Supreme Court Personnel
The initial order of business for the supreme court was
establishing contact with its employees. Their welfare and safety
were of imminent concern both prior to and after the storms made
landfall. As it had done many times before upon the threat of an
approaching storm, the supreme court had implemented its usual
disaster precautions on Friday, August 26, 2005. 93 The court
ensured that it had updated contact information on each staff
member, and it advised staffers to refer to the court website in the
event that the courthouse closed.94 To assure the availability of
funds for its employees, the court directed the processing of
payroll for state judges and court personnel on Saturday, August
27, 2005, three days early.9
5
Due to these precautionary measures, the court was able to
make contact with all of its staff within a week following
Hurricane Katrina. 96 All reported that they were safe, but many had
88. Id.
89. Id. at 7.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 6.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 7.
96. Id.
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lost their homes.97 They were displaced throughout the country
and, in light of the mandatory evacuation in New Orleans and the
surrounding areas, unable to return home for the foreseeable
future.98 Measures were taken to assure employees of the security
of their jobs. Salaries continued to be paid for a period of sixty
days. 99 Aware that displaced personnel had limited attire and
funds, the supreme court provided uniform shirts to those
employees that were able to return to work.'00 Flexible leave
polices were imposed to meet the needs of those unable to return to
work.' 0' The supreme court also made group counseling available
to staff members who had suffered personal losses as a result of the
storms. 1
02
Anticipating the return of the court to New Orleans, efforts
began to secure housing for employees in the city. Arduous
negotiations ensued with FEMA to secure trailers in the New
Orleans area.' 0 3 This effort failed, and the court acquired space at a
local hotel. 1°4 This housing permitted the court to open more
quickly. Despite their personal tribulations, ninety-five percent of
the staff returned when the supreme court building was reopened
during the first week in December, only three months after
Hurricane Katrina.105 There was no significant break in the court's
operations due to the hard work and dedication of judicial
personnel.
D. Technology and Communication
Hours following the storm's landfall, there were reports of
looting in the area near the supreme court building. 10 6 Eight critical
servers were the source of judicial administrative and business
records, attorney bar rolls,'0 7 and, most importantly, over twenty
years of judicial filings0 8 (averaging 3,000 cases filed per year).' 9
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 8.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 9.
106. Tim Greene, Courting Disaster During Katrina, NETWORK WORLD,
Aug. 21, 2006, http://www.networkworld.com/research/2006/082106-katrina-
recovery-court.html.
107. Id.
108. Olivier Interview, supra note 8.
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Due to the mass destruction to lower courts and attorneys' offices,
the court's records in many instances provided the only evidence
of filings and attorney certification. Moreover, cellular phone
communication was erratic. The court's servers were needed to
reestablish ongoing electronic communication with the court's
staff, members of the bar, and litigants.
Justice Chet Traylor, now retired,1"0 formerly of the Louisiana
State Police, directed the recovery of this critical equipment.
111
The state police had located the supreme court's director of
technoloqy at a campground where he had evacuated with his
family." Joined by a state police SWAT team and Louisiana
National Guardsmen, the director and the computer security officer
for the judicial administrator's office were given one hour to
retrieve from the supreme court building the servers and necessary
network gear, in addition to critical files. 113 They were cloaked in
body armor and surrounded by law enforcement as they
approached the building. 114 The surrounding area did suffer from
looters, but the courthouse was untouched. 15 The most difficult
problem was gaining entry into the secured building in the stifling
heat. "
6
After recovering the servers, the court's technology director
and the judicial administrator's computer security officer were able
to have the court and the judicial administrator's office back online
ninety-six hours after the storm. 117 A new network was created that
permitted the justices to resume handling cases. 18 The court's
website became the primary source of information for lower
courts, attorneys, and the general public. Notices of the closure and
reopening of courts, suspension of legal deadlines, and available
recovery resources were posted on the site.' 19 A temporary e-mail
address, which was advertised over television and radio, was
109. Peter Haas & Linus Chow, Agile Government: Portal and BPM Buoy
the Supreme Court of Louisiana's Post Katrina, BPM STRATEGIES, Nov. 2007,
at 15.
110. Justice Traylor's supreme court tenure was from January 1997 through
May 2009. See Press Release, Louisiana Supreme Court (Mar. 16, 2009), http://
www.lasc.org/press roomreleases/2009/2009-07.asp.
111. JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE 2005-2006, supra note 7, at 7.
112. Greene, supra note 106.
113. Id.; Olivier Interview, supra note 8.
114. JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE 2005-2006, supra note 7, at 7.
115. Greene, supra note 106.
116. Id.
117. Haas & Chow, supra note 109; Olivier Interview, supra note 8.
118. Greene, supra note 106.
119. See JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE 2005-2006, supra note 7, at 7.
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created for the purpose of responding to inquiries and requests for
information. 12° Each judicial district appointed one representative
to facilitate ongoing communication with the supreme court.'
2
'
This was crucial in preparing orders for court closures and
assessing the extent of damage to the lower courts.
E. Legal and Administrative Issues
Lack of access to the courts and the mass displacement of the
legal community raised numerous administrative and legal issues
that jeopardized the restoration of order and functionality to the
judiciary and legal profession. These matters called for the
supreme court's quick and thoughtful attention at the same time it
was establishing its temporary headquarters, attempting to
communicate with its staff and members of the judiciary, and
assessing physical damage to the lower courts.
1. Court Closures and Tolling of Deadlines
On September 2, 2005, the supreme court began issuing a
series of orders involving the closure of the court. The court was
closed for all non-emergency filings through December 5, 2005,
the date that the supreme court building reopened.' 2 2 Court staff
assisted the affected lower courts with the preparation and
execution of orders closing their respective courts. 1 3 Additionally,
an order was issued postponing the supreme court's scheduled
September oral arguments. 24 They were later rescheduled and
conducted at the court's temporary Baton Rouge headquarters in
late November, amazingly, only three months after Hurricane
Katrina's landfall.
12 5
The judiciary was reliant upon the executive and legislative
branches of government to accomplish the resumption of court
operations. Courthouse closures prevented access to the courts.
120. Id. at 8.
121. Id.
122. See Supreme Court of Louisiana Order (Sept. 27, 2005) (supreme court
closure through October 25, 2005); Supreme Court of Louisiana Order (Oct. 25,
2005) (closure extended through November 25, 2005, but accepting filings at its
temporary Baton Rouge location).
123. JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE 2005-2006, supra note 7, at 9.
124. See Supreme Court of Louisiana Resolution and Temporary Rule (Oct.
3, 2005).
125. Press Release, Louisiana Supreme Court (Nov. 23, 2005), http://www.
lasc.org/press-room-releases/2005/2005-16.asp [hereinafter Nov. 23, 2005
Press Release]; JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE 2005-2006, supra note 7, at 8.
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Immediate action had to be taken to suspend the tolling of legal
deadlines for the filing of new cases and those pending in the court
system. The governor issued several executive orders, which
suspended for a period of three months all legal deadlines not
constitutionally mandated. 126 The supreme court would later issue
a resolution and temporary rule allowing trial and appellate court
judges to lift or shorten the legal deadline suspension outlined in
the governor's executive orders as courthouses began reopening.1
27
A special session of the Louisiana Legislature convened in
November 2005. 128 One of the first measures it took was to ratify
the governor's suspension orders and to extend some legal
deadlines until January 3, 2006, with a possible extension in
certain circumstances to June 1, 2006, for the six parishes hardest
hit. 129
2. Criminal Justice System
Following Hurricane Katrina, approximately 8,000 prisoners
from devastated areas were relocated by the Department of Public
Safety and Corrections to thirty-four facilities across Louisiana.
130
Due to the chaotic circumstances surrounding the mass evacuation,
thousands of prisoners were unaccounted for in the correctional
system for extended periods of time.131 The courts were unable to
enforce reasonable compliance with the basic criminal procedural
requirements as a result of the prisoner displacement. Inmates were
in the custody of the state's correctional agencies. District court
facilities, district attorney' offices, and public defender offices
were under the supervisory and financial control of local
126. See Exec. Order No. KBB 05-32, La. Reg. 2169 (Sept. 6, 2005)
(suspended legal deadlines until September 25, 2005); Exec. Order No. KBB 05-
48, La. Reg. 2352 (Sept. 23, 2005) (extended Executive Order Number KBB 05-
32 and acknowledged the supreme court's constitutional authority to shorten or
lift the suspension of deadlines through court order); Exec. Order No. KBB 05-
67, La. Reg. 2675 (Oct. 19, 2005) (legal deadline suspension extended to
November 25, 2005).
127. See Supreme Court Louisiana Resolution and Temporary Rule (Oct. 3,
2005).
128. See Exec. Order No. KBB 05-67, La. Reg. 2675 (Oct. 19, 2005)
(announcement of extraordinary legislative session convening November 6,
2005, through November 18, 2005).
129. See LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:5821-:5825 (2009).
130. Paul Purpura, Inmates Freed After Months, Post-Katrina, Many 'Lost in
the System,' THE TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Dec. 23, 2005, at B 1.
131. Associate Justice Catherine Kimball, Supreme Court of Louisiana,
Remarks at the Meeting of the New York Bar Associations (Mar. 23, 2007)
[hereinafter Justice Kimball Speech].
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municipalities 132 whose infrastructures collapsed in the aftermath
of the storms.f 33 These factors, coupled with the devastated courts'
inability to conduct criminal cases outside of their jurisdiction, 134
created impediments to the recovery of the criminal justice system
beyond the power and control of the supreme court.
The legislature in its special session responded to some of the
concerns with the enactment of the Criminal Justice Emergency
and Disaster Act, crucial legislation ensuring continuity in the
disposition of criminal cases following an emergency or
disaster. 135 It allows the supreme court to suspend habeas corpus
rights in the event of govemor-declared state emergencies. 36 The
law also vests in the supreme court the power to hold emergency
court proceedings at alternative locations outside of the jurisdiction
where the inmate was subject to criminal prosecution. 13 Following
the passage of this legislation, the supreme court was able to
132. See HOUSE LEGISLATIVE SERV., LA. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
STATE & LOCAL GOV'T IN LOUISIANA: AN OVERVIEW 1B-13 (2007),
http://house.louisiana.gov/SLG/PDF/2008-2012_State&Local-Final.pdf
[hereinafter LA. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES GOV'T OVERVIEW] ("Louisiana
does not have a unified state court funding system. The operations of district,
parish, and city courts are primarily funded by local governments.").
133. James Podgers et al., Long Road to Recovery: Victims of Hurricane
Katrina Face Legal Issues at Every Turn, A.B.A. J., Feb 21, 2006,
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/longroadtorecovery/ ("Further
complicating efforts to recover from Katrina is the fact that the institutional
infrastructure in the Gulf Coast region was devastated along with the lives,
property and businesses of residents. Government agencies were overwhelmed,
courts closed and many lawyers displaced along with their clients.").
134. See LA. CONST. art. 1, § 16; see, e.g., State v. Ring, 461 So. 2d 1162,
1165 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1985) ("All trials must take place in the parish where the
offense occurred."), writ denied, 465 So. 2d 732 (La. 1985).
135. LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. arts. 941-944 (2008).
136. See LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 944(A) (2008) ("[T]he supreme
court may order emergency sessions of court at a location or locations which are
both feasible and practicable outside the parish or territorial jurisdiction of that
court. This determination shall be based upon emergency or disaster
circumstances, including but not limited to the lack of a readily available
alternative location to conduct court within the parish, terrorist events, enemy
attack, sabotage, or other hostile action, or from fire, flood, earthquake, or other
natural or manmade causes resulting in the displacement of thousands of
residents and the destruction of or severe damage to courthouses and other
facilities supporting the criminal justice system.").
137. LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 945(A) (2008) ("Venue for criminal
prosecutions in an affected court shall be changed by operation of law to the
parish where the affected court is ordered to conduct criminal sessions for the
duration of the emergency sessions. Criminal proceedings may take place in a
parish other than the parish where the crime was committed if the supreme court
has ordered emergency sessions of that court in another parish pursuant to
Article 944 or as otherwise provided by law.").
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appoint ad hoc judges to hold bond and bail hearings for displaced
inmates in various parts of the state,' 38 and district courts could
proceed with criminal trials outside of their jurisdictions. 139 In fact,
at one point, the Orleans Parish Criminal District Court was
conducting proceedings in several different jurisdictions
throughout Louisiana. 14T
3. Bar Association
The Louisiana State Bar Association (LSBA) assists the
supreme court with its constitutional responsibility to regulate the
practice of law. 14 1 In addition to serving its members in their
professional practice, the LSBA attempts to ensure access to
attorney representation. 142 Following Hurricane Katrina, the
supreme court immediately established contact with the LSBA to
assess the losses to the legal profession as a whole, the services
needed to assist licensed attorneys victimized by the storm, and the
measures needed to restore adequate attorney representation in the
state. 143 After setting up temporary offices in Lafayette with little
more than half of its staff, the LSBA estimated that fifty-two
percent of its 17,047 members enga~ed in the practice of law had
offices in hurricane-impacted areas. Displaced attorneys had no
access to their client files and court calendars.
138. See Calogero Keynote Address, infra_note 143; see also JUDICIAL
PERFORMANCE 2005-2006, supra note 7, at 8.
139. See Calogero Keynote Address, infra note 143.
140. JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE 2005-2006, supra note 7, at 23.
141. See LA. CONST. art. V, § 5(B).
142. Louisiana State Bar Association, The Mission of the Louisiana State Bar
Association, http://www.Isba.org/2007InsideLSBA/insidethebar.asp (last visited
Mar. 31, 2010) ("The LSBA ensures that every individual who needs a lawyer
has one.").
143. Chief Justice Pascal Calogero, Supreme Court of Louisiana, Keynote
Address at the National Organization of Bar Counsel Conference (Feb. 8, 2006)
[hereinafter Calogero Keynote Address]; JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE 2005-2006,
supra note 7, at 9.
144. JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE 2005-2006, supra note 7, at 9 (Fifty-two
percent of active lawyers in Louisiana had offices in hurricane-impacted areas.);
Justice Kimball Speech, supra note 131 (17,047 active lawyers in Louisiana at
the time of Hurricane Katrina); see also Sheryl B. Shapiro, American Bar
Associations's Response to Unauthorized Practice Problems Following
Hurricane Katrina: Optimal or Merely Adequate?, 20 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
905, 906 (2007) ("Similarly, in Louisiana, at least 50 percent of the state's
practicing lawyers lost homes, offices, or both. There were about 8,000 lawyers
practicing in the New Orleans metropolitan area before Katrina, and the best
estimates are that at least half were still gone months after the storm." (footnotes
omitted)).
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The LSBA's earliest effort was to create a website message
board for attorneys to establish communication with their clients
and other members of the profession. 145 It also opened a business
center to provide to displaced attorneys access to computers, work
space, meeting rooms, and legal research tools. 146 The association
established a legal assistance call center where members of the bar
tirelessly volunteered time to those seeking help in the wake of the
storms. "7 Other states' supreme courts issued orders that allowed
attorneys displaced by Hurricane Katrina to practice law
provisionally in their new locations. 148 Many lawyers received
offers of assistance in setting up temporary offices from out-of-
state attorneys. 149 The shortage of available Louisiana licensed
attorneys in the face of a dramatic increase in the need for pro
bono legal counsel for hurricane victims resulted in the supreme
court's approval of temporary rules allowing qualified out-of-state
attorneys and non-admitted lawyers to provide pro bono civil legal
assistance in storm-related matters. 50 The first rule was enacted in
October 2005.151
145. LA. STATE BAR Ass'N, BD. OF GOVERNORs TELEPHONE CONFERENCE
SEPT. 6, 2006 MINuTEs (2005), http://www.lsba.org/2007documents/minutes/
Sept62005minutes.pdf.
146. Birkland & Schneider, supra note 80, at 30.
147. Elizabeth Foote, 18 Months and Counting: Cooperative Efforts Keep
Disaster Legal Assistance Call Center Available to Help Citizens, LA. B.J.,
Feb./Mar. 2007, at 340-41.
148. See Press Release, National Center for State Courts, News Alert!
Hurricane Katrina/Hurricane Wilma Updates (Jan. 31, 2006), www.ncsonline.
org/What'sNew/NewsAlerts/NewsAlertKatrina.html (Sixteen states issued
orders allowing attorneys displaced by Hurricane Katrina to practice law
provisionally); see also Shapiro, supra note 144 (article dedicated to the
discussion of multijurisdictional practice issues raised by Hurricanes Katrina
and Rita and the ABA's efforts to avoid similar problems through the enactment
of model rules).
149. Shapiro, supra note 144, at 906.
150. See also JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF THE SUPREME COURT, SUPREME COURT OF
LOUISIANA: ANNUAL REPORT 4 (2008), http://www.lasc.org/pressroon/annual
reports/reports/2008_AnnualReport.pdf [hereinafter JUDICIAL COUNCIL, 2008
ANNUAL REPORT] (emergency pro bono rule enacted to allow out-of-state
attorneys to donate time to assist hurricane victims).
151. See Supreme Court of Louisiana Order, Emergency Pro Bono Civil
Legal Assistance Rule (Oct. 10, 2005); Supreme Court of Louisiana Order,
Supplemental Emergency Pro Bono Civil Legal Assistance Rule (Jan. 20, 2006);
Supreme Court Order, Supplemental Emergency Pro Bono Civil Legal
Assistance Rule (Jan. 17, 2007); see also JUDICIAL COUNCIL, 2008 ANNUAL
REPORT, supra note 150, at 4 (As of 2008, 198 out-of-state attorneys sought
admission under the Emergency Civil Pro Bono Rule to donate time to assist
hurricane victims.).
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The LSBA sponsored courses in criminal indigent defense for
those willing to volunteer their time to help reestablish the criminal
justice system. 52 In June 2006, the supreme court created a legal
assistance rule to permit non-admitted lawyers, under the
supervision of a Louisiana lawyer, to render temporary pro bono
criminal legal services to indigent persons arrested or charged with
crimes in Orleans Parish.
1 53
The supreme court eased the professional requirements
imposed on Louisiana's licensed attorneys. It issued an order
suspending continuing legal education and financial obligations for
the year 2005.154 The court also requested that all state court judges
waive the dress code for displaced attorneys. 155 Judges were also
asked to exercise patience with lawyers who were excusably tardy
for court proceedings attributable to traffic congestion in newly
overcrowded cities and who requested continuances due to lost
files and an inability to locate clients and trial participants.' 
56
The Committee on Bar Admissions, an arm of the LSBA, had
administered the bar examination in July 2005157 to those seeking
admission to the practice of law in Louisiana. Less than two
months following Hurricane Katrina's landfall and amidst judicial
recovery operations, the supreme court conducted a bar admission
ceremony in Baton Rouge for those who satisfied the requirements
for admission to the state's legal profession. 158 However, numerous
bar exams administered in the summer had been destroyed in flood
waters. 159 For the first time in history, the supreme court allowed
individuals seeking admission to retake portions of the bar
examination. 160 A second admission ceremony was held in
November 2005 for those applicants satisfying the prerequisites for
admission. 161
152. Vance, supra note 65, at 647 & n.243 (citing Press Release, Louisiana
State Bar Association, Hurricane Katrina Relief Seminar at Tulane Law School
(Mar. 20, 2006)).
153. See Supreme Court of Louisiana Order, Temporary Emergency Pro
Bono Criminal Legal Assistance Rule for Orleans Parish (June 23, 2006).
154. See Supreme Court of Louisiana Order (Sept. 26, 2005).
155. JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE 2005-2006, supra note 7, at 9.
156. Chief Justice Pascal Calogero, Supreme Court of Louisiana, Remarks at
the Southwest Louisiana Bar Association 2006 Bench Bar Conference (Apr. 21,
2006) [hereinafter Chief Justice Calogero Speech].
157. Id.
158. JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE 2005-2006, supra note 7, at 9.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
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F. FEMA Disaster Assistance
In the first days following the storm, the supreme court
established contact with representatives from FEMA, the
beginning of a relationship that continues as of this writing. The
federal agency dispatched representatives specialized in court
disaster recovery. 62Monetary assistance was immediately sought
on behalf of the state courts for the costs associated with the
temporary relocation of courthouses, housing, reestablishment of
operations, and damage to court facilities.' 
63
This effort was complicated by the fact that, unlike the
supreme court and the five circuit courts of appeal, which are
funded by state tax dollars, 64 the funding for district courts is at
the discretion of local governments through revenues ordinarily
generated by tax assessments, traffic fines, and court costs. 165 In
most cases, parish attomeys, coroners, sheriffs, clerks of court, and
court staff share the same revenue source as the courts.' 66 Thus,
although the supreme court is vested with the judicial power to do
all that is reasonably necessary for the exercise of the function of
the courts, the restoration of full judicial district court operations
was dependent on the local municipalities, many of which had
sustained catastrophic damages. This separation of powers issue
placed the court in the dilemma of being responsible for the
operation of the districts, which are funded by a number of
municipalities beyond the court's control.
With the assistance of FEMA, state courts temporarily
relocated to various cities throughout south Louisiana. The fourth
circuit established operations on the campus of Southeastern
Louisiana University in Hammond, approximately forty minutes
from New Orleans."67 The Orleans Parish Civil District Court
moved to Gonzales, about sixty miles outside of New Orleans. 168
The Orleans Parish Criminal District Court conducted legal
proceedings at various sites to accommodate displaced inmates,
even after it moved its central operations to the federal courthouse
162. Olivier Interview, supra note 8.
163. Chief Justice Calogero Speech, supra note 156.
164. I. Jackson Burson, Jr., Not Endowed by Their Creator: State Mandated
Expenses of Louisiana Parish Governing Bodies, 50 LA. L. REV. 635, 673-74
(1990).
165. Id.; see also LA. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES GOV'T OVERVIEW, supra
note 132, at 1B-13.
166. Burson, supra note 164, at 643, 675.
167. Birkland & Schneider, supra note 80, at 26.
168. See, e.g., JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE 2005-2006, supra note 7, at 23.
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in New Orleans.' 69 The establishment of temporary court
operations required innumerable jurists and their staff to travel
hours to and from work due to the limited availability of housing.
To ease this burden, lower courts in the unaffected and less
affected areas opened their doors to judicial employees, making
available office space, law libraries, and computers.
Members of the supreme court met with FEMA representatives
several times per week.17 ' The process involved incalculable
delays for countless reasons.17 2 The agency's high attrition rate
contributed in large part to the frustration.173 FEMA was ill-
equipped to respond to a disaster of such catastrophic
proportions. 174 Notwithstanding, supreme court personnel involved
in the FEMA process are in unanimous agreement that the
agency's representatives shared the judiciary's vision of complete
and speedy restoration of court operations.
III. PROGRESS: DISASTER RECOVERY AND CONTINUITY OF
OPERATIONS
The supreme court returned to New Orleans on December 5,
2005.176 The occasion was marked by a commemorative
celebration, the Red Mass of the Healing and Renewal of New
Orleans, at the St. Louis Cathedral, 77 the sight of countless
gatherings of similar importance during the long history of the
state of Louisiana and the city of New Orleans.'7 8 Upon this return,
the suspension of non-emergency court filings was lifted, and
judicial review was given to the deferred writs applications. Efforts
were made by the court to resume its pre-storm docket schedule,1
7 9
169. Id.
170. Id. at 26-27.
171. Id. at 8.
172. Meeting between Supreme Court of Louisiana Executive Staff and
Angelique Roche & Ben Billings, Office of U.S. Senator Mary Landrieu,
Louisiana Judiciary's Progress Post-Hurricanes Katrina & Rita (Nov. 23, 2009)
[hereinafter LASC/Sen. Landrieu Meeting]
173. Id
174. Lisa Stark, FEMA Was Unprepared for Katrina Relief Effort, Insiders
Say: Bureaucracy, Budget Cuts Said to Contribute to Slow Response, ABC
NEWS, Sept. 8, 2005, http://abcnew.go.com/print?id=l 108268.
175. LASC/Sen. Landrieu Meeting, supra note 172.
176. JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE 2005-2006, supra note 7, at 9.
177. Nov. 23, 2005 Press Release, supra note 125.
178. See Cathedral-Basilica of Saint Louis King of France: History of the St.
Louis Cathedral (last visited April 24, 2010), http://stlouiscathedral.org/
earlyhistory.html.
179. Annually, the court holds thirty-three to thirty-five weekly conferences to
consider and vote on writ filings, usually voting on more than 100 writ
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although it continued daily consideration of the numerous
administrative matters related to the judiciary's disaster recovery.
By the summer of 2006, each of the lower courts that had
sustained damage had reopened for business, but not all in their
pre-storm facilities. 180 Many affected courts returned to their
original courthouses, several while repairs continued. State courts
resumed operations despite the continued displacement of jurists
and staff. Like the supreme court, some courts acknowledged a
need for mental health assistance for their employees by offering
classes on coping in the aftermath of the traumatic events.'
l9
Attracted by affordable housing in less flood-prone communities,
many Orleans, Jefferson, and St. Bernard Parish employees moved
to other parishes after losing their homes and personal belongings.
Permanent relocation added hours of daily commute time in most
instances.
The courts responded to the shifts in population attributable to
the storms. Several courts retained bilingual personnel due to an
increase in the Hispanic community resulting from post-hurricane
employment opportunities. 8 2 On a larger scale, population
changes have required the judiciary to continually monitor the
apportionment of judges among the network of state courts. In
2006, the legislature authorized the Louisiana Supreme Court's
Judicial Council to conduct a review of the judicial districts and
provide recommendations on the appropriate number of district
court judgeships within each district based upon caseload,
applications per conference. See JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATOR'S OFFICE, THE
SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA, JUSTICE AT WORK: THE STATE OF JUDICIAL
PERFORMANCE IN LOUISIANA 2006-2007, at 13 (2007), http://www.lasc.org/press
room/annual-reports/reports/2006_7jp.pdf [hereinafter JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE
2006-2007]. The court also holds at a minimum seven oral argument sittings each
year with approximately twenty to twenty-four cases argued each cycle. Id.
Ordinarily, writ applications that are granted are scheduled for oral argument on
the next available docket, and the opinions are usually handed down within twelve
weeks of the oral argument. Id.
180. Justice Kimball Speech, supra note 131.
181. See JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE 2005-2006, supra note 7, at 7 (supreme
court offered counseling to its employees impacted by the storms); see also
JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE 2006-2007, supra note 179, at 95 (Jefferson Parish
offered mental health assistance to employees following the hurricanes.).
182. See, e.g., JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE 2006-2007, supra note 179, at 47,
71, 131-32 (The Louisiana Fourth and Fifth Circuit Courts of Appeal and the
Jefferson and Orleans Parish Criminal District Court provide for bilingual or
multilingual services to court patrons.).
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population, and other pertinent factors.' 83 This in-depth review is
ongoing today.'
84
As the courts reestablished operations, their dockets were
inundated with hurricane-related claims. The following types of
cases are just a small sampling. Evacuee families sought
preliminary injunctions against hotels that engaged in price
gouging., Landlords seeking to place abandoned rental properties
back into commerce sought the eviction of their lessees.
186
Property owners instituted construction-related claims. 187 Class
action litigation was instituted against chemical refineries for
storm-related spillage. 188 Some cases focused on the patient care
administered by medical providers' 89 and nursing home owners.19
0
Law enforcement personnel sought review of civil service
disciplinary sanctions imposed for abandonment of duties.'
91
Litigation was instituted to contest the unavailability of public
health care due to hospital closures. 192 Courts were deluged with
183. The supreme court created the Judicial Council pursuant to Louisiana
Supreme Court Rule XXII. LA. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES GOV'T OVERVIEW,
supra note 132, at 1B-5. It consists of not more than seventeen voting members,
generally serving for three terms, that include the jurists, legislators, and one
non-lawyer citizen. Id. Its essential function is to study judicial organization,
rules, and practices; to formulate methods for simplifying judicial procedure,
expediting the transaction of judicial business and correcting faults in the
administration of justice; and to make an annual report. Id. The legislature
codified the Judicial Council's involvement in the process of altering a territorial
jurisdiction and creating a new judgeship, judicial district, and judicial court. Id.
In the event a change is proposed, the Judicial Council organizes an evaluation
team to investigate such and make a recommendation to the full council. In turn,
the Judicial Council presents the team's findings and makes a recommendation
to the legislature. Id. With few exceptions, no new judgeships have been created
without a recommendation from the Judicial Council based on specific criteria
showing the need for additional judgeships. See also LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
13:61 (Supp. 2010)
184. JUDICIAL COuNcIL, 2008 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 150, at 2-3
(reapportioning ofjudicial districts continually addressed by judiciary).
185. Adrian Angelettee, Judge Blocks Try by Hotel to Evict Storm Evacuees,
THE ADVOCATE (Baton Rouge), Oct. 21, 2005, at 13A.
186. Id.; see also, e.g., Strickland v. Gordon, No. 2009-CA-0856, 2010 WL
726521 (La. App. 4th Cir. Mar. 3, 2010).
187. See, e.g., Nuerge v. Coldewy Corp., 14 So. 3d 39 (La. App. 5th Cir.
2009).
188. See, e.g., Vekic v. Shell Pipeline Co. LP, No. 08-C-1469, 2009 WL
213105 (La. App. 4th Cir. Jan. 29, 2009).
189. See, e.g., In re A Matter Under Investigation, 15 So. 3d 972 (La. 2009);
In re A Matter of An Offense Under Investigation, 926 So. 2d 493 (La. 2006).
190. See, e.g., Berthelot v. Patient's Compensation Fund Oversight Bd., 977
So. 2d 967 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2007), writ denied, 976 So. 2d 720 (La. 2008).
191. See, e.g., Leblanc v. Dep't of Police, 972 So. 2d 398 (La. 2007).
192. See, e.g., Leblanc v. Thomas, 23 So. 3d 241 (La. 2009).
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insurance cases, with the most notable being Sher v. Lafayette
Insurance Company, where it was determined that homeowner
insurance policies did not have to cover flood damages caused
directly by the levee breaches in the wake of Hurricane Katrina.
193
To accommodate litigants already victimized by the storms,
appellate courts adopted policies promoting expedited
consideration of storm cases.194
The state's juvenile courts recognized the dire consequences
for the children victimized by the storms. Courts undertook the
commendable challenge of reconnecting biological families and
seeking homes for more than 300 foster children. 195 The Court
Improvement Program of the supreme court joined efforts with
state and community social service departments to create the
Connections for Permanency Program. 196 The intent of the project
was to connect children in state custody with biological or foster
family members, or other persons willing to be a permanent
connection for a child. 1
97
IV. THE COLLAPSE OF THE INDIGENT DEFENDER SYSTEM
The destruction left in the wake of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita
created the unprecedented challenge of deciding how to react to the
disasters while providing constitutional protections afforded to
thousands of accused in the state's criminal justice system.
Hurricane Katrina created an unmanageable situation with the
mass evacuation of thousands of inmates from the Orleans Parish
Prison, the country's eighth largest penal institution,198 to dozens
of facilities throughout the state. The evacuation was under exigent
circumstances and, as such, chaotic. There was no segregation of
inmates based on the seriousness of offense. Thus, those with
municipal traffic violations were housed with hardened
193. Sher v. Lafayette Ins. Co., 988 So. 2d 186, 195 (La. 2008) (The supreme
court upheld an insurer's flood exclusion stating, "Even if the exclusion only
referred to natural, rather than man-made floods, the flood at issue was not
caused by man. The flood was caused by Hurricane Katrina, not by man. The
levees did not cause the flood, they, whether through faulty design, faulty
construction, or some other reason, failed to prevent the flood.").
194. See, e.g., JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE 2006-2007, supra note 179, at 45-46
(The Louisiana Third and Fourth Circuit Courts of Appeal adopted special
procedures to expedite Katrina-related cases.).
195. JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE 2006-2007, supra note 179, at 28-29.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. See Orleans Parish Criminal Sheriff's Office, Orleans Parish Criminal
Sheriff Marlin N. Gusman, http://www.opcso.orgindex.php?option=com content
&view=article&id= 145&Itemid=197 (last visited Mar. 5, 2010).
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offenders. 199 Nor was there a separation based on stage of
prosecution. As such, inmates arrested, but not arraigned, were
held with those criminally charged.200 The absence of records
identifying the inmates, their offense and their status in the legal
system created a logistical disaster.201 Moreover, the relocation of
inmates was only one factor contributing to the problems in the
criminal justice system. The storm's damage closed courthouses
and jails; displaced jurists, witnesses, and potential jurors; and
compromised files, records, and evidence.
20 2
State and local governments were grappling with so many
financial and infrastructure issues that it became difficult to
comply with speedy trial guarantees. The inability to access the
courts caused a case backlog of more than 3,000 cases in New
Orleans, resulting in many defendants charged with minor crimes
being imprisoned for a longer time than the statutory maximum
sentence. 03 The majority of the inmates incarcerated in Orleans
Parish Prison were arrested in the days prior to the storm for minor
offenses, such as criminal trespass, public intoxication, or
disorderly conduct.20 4 Of these, many had not been brought before
a judge or formally charged and would have only been subject to a
ticket.20 5 Hundreds of these defendants languished in the system
for months.20 6 Delays, the loss of evidence, and displaced
witnesses raised viable concerns about the fairness of criminal
proceedings.
199. Justice Kimball Speech, supra note 131.
200. Id.
201. Id. Post-evacuation efforts to identify inmates by a system of colored
arm bands were met with resistance due to the antics of inmates stealing bands
from individuals facing less serious offenses. Id.
202. Chief Justice Pascal F. Calogero, Supreme Court of Louisiana, 2007
State of the Judiciary Address to the Joint Session of the House and Senate
Louisiana Legislature (May 8, 2007), available at http://www.lasc.org/press_
room/press-releases/2007/2007-09.asp (May 8, 2007) [hereinafter 2007 State of
the Judiciary Address].
203. See Purpura, supra note 130.
204. Garrett & Tetlow, supra note 63, at 8.
205. Id.
206. See Amber McIlwain, Abandoned Behind Bars-Hurricane Katrina's
Prisoners, THE TIMES, Oct. 17, 2006, http://business.timesline.co.ik/tol/business/
law/article600447.ece? (last visited Apr. 26, 2010) ("Twelve months [since
Hurricane Katrina] and hundreds of prisoners still remain incarcerated, having
already greatly exceeded what they would have served had they pleaded or been
found guilty, but more disturbing is that most have not even been charged yet.");
see also Henry Weinstein, Louisiana Official Opens Probe of Court System,
L.A. TIMEs, Feb. 24, 2006 at A23 (court appointed special master "estimated
that as many as 4,500 people had been 'sitting in jail for up to six months and
haven't seen a lawyer during that time.').
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However, it was the lack of legal representation that most
seriously threatened the integrity of the legal process for many
accused. The inability to access the courts with the assistance of
reliable counsel was a major impediment to many of the accused
individuals asserting constitutional violations, such as their right to
a speedy trial.20 7 Most of the accused, especially those from the
New Orleans area, lacked resources to retain a private criminal
defense lawyer. 208 In 2005, more than eighty percent of defendants
from Orleans Parish were indigent and entitled to use the Orleans
Indigent Defender Program (OID).2°9 Most of the OID's funding
came from the collection of court costs on traffic fine
assessments., 210 This source of funding became virtually non-
existent immediately after the storms. 2r The number of public
defenders decreased from forty-two to seven immediately after the
storm.
2 12
The health of local indigent defender systems has been a
longstanding concern to the courts.21 3 The Louisiana Constitution
requires that the legislature provide for a uniform system of
207. See Garrett & Tetlow, supra note 63, at 3, 30, 31 ("With local courts
closed and with a skeletal public defender, procedure rights had no practical
significance.... [O]nce identified, most of the thousands of detainees had no
defense lawyer to raise constitutional claims .... Constitutional rights to due
process, access to counsel and courts and speedy trial played little role in
safeguarding rights of thousands detained after Katrina. The system simply
collapsed with courts conducting no hearings, no trials and with no defense
counsel available."); see also Weinstein, supra note 206, (Orleans Parish
criminal court judge issued a formal policy statement that "it was 'of utmost
importance' that adequate funding be provided to New Orleans indigent defense
office 'with deliberate speed.., because the United States Constitution and the
Louisiana Constitution guarantee the right to effective assistance of counsel to
indigent persons').
208. Garrett & Tetlow, supra note 63, at 7.
209. Michael Perlstein, Public Defender Cases In Limbo, Indigent Program
Broken, Judge says, THE TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Feb. 11, 2006, at
METRO 1.
210. Phyllis E. Mann, Hurricanes Katrina and Rita-A Year Later in
Louisiana, CHAMPION, Feb. 2006, at 6, 7; see also Weinstein, supra note 206,
("Louisiana is the only state that uses traffic fines as the main source of funding
for indigent defense. The system has been criticized in a host of studies.").
211. Id.
212. Perlstein, supra note 209.
213. See JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF THE SUPREME COURT, SUPREME COURT OF
LOUISIANA: ANNUAL REPORT 1 (2007), http://www.lasc.org/press-room/annual_
reports/2007Annual Report.pdf (judiciary cites concerns regarding indigent
defender system's inadequate funding and necessary reforms); 2007 State of the
Judiciary Address, supra note 202 (In 2005, the judiciary implored the
legislature to establish an indigent defender system that prevents multiple trials
for the benefit of victims and the innocent deprived of their liberties.).
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securing and compensating jualified counsel for indigents accused
in criminal prosecutions.' The harsh lessons learned in the
aftermath of the storms dictated that the three branches of
government collaborate to create a cohesive contingency plan for
the criminal justice system in the event of future disasters.
Months after the hurricanes, Vice-Admiral Thad Allen, Chief
of Staff for the U.S. Coast Guard assigned to direct the national
disaster recovery, established a federal task force specifically
designed to address the area's criminal justice system. 215 The
Southeast Louisiana Recovery Task Force on Criminal Justice
(Task Force) is composed of law enforcement officials, district
attorneys, indigent defenders, judges, and clerks of court. 2 16 The
Task Force provides a unique opportunity for dialogue among its
members.217 It has various committees, and Justice Kimball serves
as chair of the judicial committee.218 The Task Force provides a
vehicle for securing grant money,2 19 obtaining experts from the
Department of Justice's Bureau of Justice Assistance to study and
make recommendations in overhauling the indigent defender
system, and assisting with the FEMA transactions. 22 0 The Task
Force continues to serve a vital role in the improvement of the
criminal justice system.
In 2007, the Louisiana Legislature responded to the criminal
justice crisis with the enactment of the Louisiana Public Defender
Act.221 The legislation created a statewide indigent defender board
vested with broad regulatory and enforcement capabilities. 2 22 The
intent of the enactment is the delivery of indigent defender
services.
22 3
Other agencies are working to avoid the problems brought to
light by the storms. Most importantly, state and local correctional
214. LA. CONST. art. I, § 13.
215. JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE 2005-2006, supra note 7, at 10.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. See, e.g., id. (The supreme court applied for and obtained a $950,000
grant to establish an Orleans Parish Criminal Justice Recovery Resource Center.
It provides the Orleans Parish criminal justice system with much needed
resources, such as temporary support staffing and consultant services (i.e.,
secretaries, transcribers, and translators), technical assistance, and investigation
of additional funding or grant opportunities.).
220. JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE 2005-2006, supra note 7, at 10.
221. 2007 La. Acts No. 307, § 1 (codified as amended at LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 15:141-:184 (2005 & Supp. 2010)).
222. See LA. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES GOV'T OVERVIEW, supra note
132, at 1B-6.
223. Id.
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systems and law enforcement agencies are devising and testing
contingency plans for the evacuation of inmates.224 These
measures, coupled with the supreme court's authority to establish
courts outside of jurisdictional limits in times of emergency, 225 will
ensure the continuity of judicial operations.
V. PREPARING FOR THE FUTURE
The federal judiciary has designed Continuity of Operation
Plans (COOP) to preserve its court system in the event of a
disaster.2 26 The planning applies to the internal actions of a court to
ensure that the capability exists to maintain essential functions in
response to a comprehensive array of possible interruptions to
court operations, such as natural and man-made disasters,
inoperable facilities, or outbreaks of sickness and violence. 227 The
federal judiciary's adopted policy is that with an effective COOP
plan, courts can perform their essential operations from alternative
operating sites during an emergency situation.
228
In 2003, the Louisiana Supreme Court began the task of
devising its own COOP,2 29 using as guides the models adopted by
the federal courts and the model recommended by the National
Center for State Courts.230 Unfortunately, the court's integral plan
was partially incomplete when operations shut down with the
approach of Hurricane Katrina in the summer of 2005. 23 1 The
absence of a comprehensive COOP hampered the reestablishment
of judicial functions, but aspects of the uncompleted plan proved to
be beneficial in many respects. For example, temporary courthouse
locations were already inspected months prior to the storms.
232
224. See Welcome to Orleans Parish Criminal Sheriff's Office, Videos-
OPSCO: Oct. 2009 Community Report, http://www.opcso.org (last visited Mar.
5,2010).
225. See LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. arts. 941-956 (2008).
226. George B. Huff, Jr., Planning for Disasters: Emergency Preparedness,
Continuity Planning, and the Federal Judiciary, 45 JUDGES J. 7, 7-8 (2006).
227. Id. at 9-10.
228. Id. at 9.
229. See E-mail from John T. Olivier, Supreme Court Clerk of Court,
Supreme Court of Louisiana, to National Courts of Appeal Clerk of Courts,
(Oct. 4, 2005, 15:15 CST) (on file with the author) [hereinafter Olivier E-mail].
230. Olivier Interview, supra note 8.
231. Olivier E-mail, supra note 229. (In response to a request for a COOP
model from a Tennessee judicial employee, the supreme court clerk of court
responded that, at the time Hurricane Katrina hit, the court's COOP was
scheduled to be presented to the justices for approval on September 21, 2005.).
232. Olivier Interview, supra note 8.
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Retention of satellite phones due to the anticipated loss of cellular
communication had already been explored.233
The supreme court has strongly urged parish governments to
allocate funds to local courts for the adoption of a COOP disaster
plan. The Louisiana District Judges Association has made earnest
efforts to this end.234 Several state courts, including the supreme
court, have successfully completed and continue to revise their
respective newly adopted COOP plans. 235 Other courts are still in
the planning stages, with progress being dictated by the availability
of financial resources.
236
One of the most noticeable deficiencies in the supreme court's
disaster recovery and continuity of operations plan was the court's
total dependency on technology equipment and hardware located
in a geographical area commonly subject to flooding and torrential
hurricanes. As a consequence, the court's entire network system
was rebuilt to provide for the full real-time replication of data for a
backup site and laptop computers. 2 3 A second technology center
was constructed in an undisclosed location in North Louisiana to
serve as a backup technology hot site in the event of an
emergency.238 The disaster center's system consistently replicates
the information stored on the court's primary network servers.
2 39
Therefore, in the event that the New Orleans data servers are
disabled for any purpose, including a natural disaster, the
emergency backup system can be engaged in less than one hour,
240
without the loss of court data or the ability to electronically
communicate. 241 Anticipating the unavailability of personnel,
233. Olivier Interview, supra note 8.
234. See LA. DIST. JUDGES ASS'N, DISASTER RECOVERY TEMPLATE: A GUIDE
TO PREPAREDNESS (2006).
235. See, e.g., JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE 2006-2007, supra note 179, at 72-
74, 98, 104 (District courts in Calcasieu and St. Tammany Parishes and the East
Baton Rouge Juvenile Court reported that they had implemented a COOP.).
236. See, e.g., id. at 104 (La Salle Parish preparing a COOP based on
availability of resources).
237. Greene, supra note 106.
238. Id. The fourth and fifth circuits, both being located in the New Orleans
metropolitan area, are subject to perils of flooding and hurricane activity. Like
the supreme court, the two appellate courts constructed a secondary technology
center for emergency operations. Telephone Interview with Peter Haas, Director,
Supreme Court of Louisiana Technology Department, in New Orleans, La. (Feb.
26, 2010).
239. Greene, supra note 106.
240. Id.
241. See, e.g., Press Release, CA, Louisiana Supreme Court Disaster
Recovery Plan Prevails When Hurricane Gustav Forces Evacuation: Leverages
CA's Disaster Recovery Software to Successfully Protect all Data, Emails and
Keep Communications Open throughout Storm (Sept. 10, 2008), available at
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technology staff was cross-trained for various tasks outside of their
area of expertise, including how to recover data systems should
both the sites become inoperable.
242
The proactive steps taken since the summer of 2005 by state
courts to improve their disaster recovery and continuity of
operation plans proved useful when Hurricane Gustav forced a
mandatory evacuation of parts of Louisiana in late August of
2008.243 Several courts, including the supreme court, successfully
and effectively implemented the course of action devised by their
respective COOP plans. 244 While Hurricane Gustav was certainly
not welcome, it afforded state courts the opportunity to battle-test
their latest efforts to improve their disaster recovery systems and,
subsequently, tweak their plans in preparation for the next
emergency.
CONCLUSION
With the approach of the fifth anniversary of Hurricanes
Katrina and Rita, the judiciary should not allow the vital lessons
learned in the wake of the destruction to fade from consciousness.
The Louisiana court system was faced with the unprecedented
tasks of responding to two of our nation's greatest natural
disasters, while maintaining the integrity of judicial operations
statewide. Let us reaffirm our dedication to the administration of
justice and commemorate the tragic events by diligently preparing
for future emergencies.
http://investor.ca.com/releasedetail.cfm?ReleaselD=333517 ("Throughout the
storm, [the justices] kept email communications with all their constituencies--
including the lower courts, residents, justices, local authorities and lawyers.").
242. Greene, supra note 106.
243. See Tim Greene, Katrina Whipped Louisiana Court into Shape for
Gustav: Gustav had Nowhere Near the Effect on the Louisiana Supreme Court
Of Katrina, COMPUTERWORLD, Sept. 22, 2008, http://computerworld.co.nz/
news.nsf/printer/D002D7C7A2248DABCC2574C80079C336 ("[T]he chief
justice accessed servers in New Orleans throughout the storm to reach files
needed to write and issue emergency orders waiving enforcement of certain state
laws, such as the right to be arraigned within 72 hours of arrest."); see also Mark
Fontecchio, Data Center News: Louisiana Supreme Court Applies Disaster
Recovery Lessons to Gustav, SEARCHDATACENTER.COM, Sept. 29, 2008,
http://searchdatacenter.techtarget.com/news/article/0,289142,sid80gci 1332536,0
0.html.
244. See, e.g., JUDICIAL CouNcIL, 2008 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 150, at
85, 89, 142 (The New Orleans Municipal Court, Orleans Parish Criminal
District Court, and Fifteenth Judicial District Court reported successful
activation of emergency preparedness plans.).
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